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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines maritime security cooperation among Singapore, Indonesia 
and Malaysia in the Strait of Malacca. Southeast Asian states have traditionally 
considered multilateral military cooperation among themselves as taboo because of 
tensions arising from territorial and other political disputes. However, this thesis 
demonstrates that their aversion to multilateral forms of military cooperation has 
decreased in the post 9/11 period.  This change can be attributed to the relaxation of 
historical tensions, the recognition of a common threat in piracy and maritime terrorism, 
an increase in extra-regional pressure to cooperate, and changes in the strategic 
environment since the end of the Cold War. This thesis also examines the three countries’ 
maritime assets and their procurement strategies to enhance their capabilities to patrol 
and defend their maritime areas.  Although assets are limited, it finds that efforts to 
coordinate maritime patrols have contributed to a sharp decline since 2004 in attacks on 
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This thesis seeks to examine the maritime security efforts conducted by Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore in patrolling the Strait of Malacca in order to deter and prosecute 
acts of terrorism and piracy to ensure unfettered access to the strait as a safe Sea Line Of 
Communication (SLOC).  More specifically this thesis seeks to understand why 
multilateral cooperation between the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
has become reality and what has led to the increased levels of cooperation between these 
states where in the past cooperation was negligible or non-existent.  In this thesis I have 
conducted research to examine the various types of security cooperation and cooperation 
in general to determine what, if anything, has changed over time that would compel these 
states to cooperate on a multilateral basis.  Furthermore, research has been conducted on 
types of maritime assets each state has in order to determine if asset types and 
interoperability may have had any effect on the levels of cooperation prior to, and after, 
September 11, 2001, as well as to add to the current literature on the maritime assets of 
these states.  Researching maritime assets contributes to the current literature on defense 
cooperation between these states because information on specific asset types, capabilities, 
and interoperability is lacking. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
 In determining why littoral state cooperation has changed it is important to 
understand not only how the norms and international environment have changed over 
time but also to understand how the Strait of Malacca, transnational crime and the 
possibility of maritime terrorism play a role.  The Strait of Malacca can be considered an 
important piece in determining the increased levels of cooperation because of the strait’s 
strategic importance as a passage and possible chokepoint for international trade.  
Transnational crime is tied to the strategic importance of the strait and if not for these 
crimes, user states would not have to worry about the well being of their ships and cargo 
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as they transit through the passage.  The Straits of Malacca and the transnational crime 
activities that have reared themselves in the strait cause concern for users and have led 
states such as Japan and the United States to exert pressure on the littoral states to do 
more. 
1. Strait of Malacca 
Oceans dominate the Southeast Asia region and cover roughly 80 percent of its 
area.1  Within Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca is geographically important and is 
used as a gateway for many ocean-moving commercial, private and military vessels.  The 
strait lies between the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore just north of 
the Indonesian island of Sumatra and south of Malaysia.  It is 600 miles in length and is 
the main corridor of passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.2  
Approximately 60,000 ships traverse the strait each year, transporting more than 80 
percent of Northeast Asia’s oil.3  One quarter of the world’s commerce passes through 
the Strait of Malacca.4  In terms of value 525 million metric tons worth more than $390 
billion dollars pass through annually.5  According to Lloyd’s List bulletin, new orders for 
over 200 liquefied natural gas carriers will be required to satisfy the growth demand of 
natural gas in the future.6 This trend of increased vessels means that traffic will increase 
within the strait.  This presumption is indicated by the observed traffic data reported via 
the Strait Reporting System (STRAITREP).  Between 1999 and 2003 traffic flows have 
increased by 42 percent.7 
                                                 
1 John F. Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 
Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 63. 
2 Joshua Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (July/August 
2006): 559. 
3 Ibid., 560. 
4 Tamara Renee Shie, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-
ASEAN Cooperation,” Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham Gerard 
Ong-Webb (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006), 164. 
5 Ho, The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia, 560. 
6 Joshua Ho, Maritime Counter-Terrorism: A Singapore Perspective, IDSS Commentary (2004): 2. 
7 Ibid. 
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User states that find the strait most important include China, Japan and the United 
States (US) because of their reliance on the strait for their economic livelihoods and 
security, either real or perceived.  For the PRC the strategic importance of the strait 
increases every year with approximately 60 percent of its crude oil imports originating 
from the Middle East and traveling through the Strait of Malacca.8  This figure is 
expected to rise to 75 percent by 2015.9  Japanese concerns originate from the fact that it 
is dependent on the sea for both its military and economic security.10  90 percent of 
Japan’s imports are carried to it by way of the sea.11  Like China, much of its crude oil 
also travels to it from the Middle East.  The United States, as the world’s dominant 
military power, uses the straits for the transit of its naval vessels to keep the oceans open 
for the safe passage of all vessels.  
According to a report conducted in 2003 by the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade’s Economic Analytical Unit, the unchecked cost of terrorism and 
piracy would affect the economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
nations, including the littoral states, the most.12  The reason for the disproportionate costs 
is that the littoral states depend heavily on foreign trade and investment.  Foreign direct 
investment would be at risk due to possible increases in terrorist activity and higher costs 
of insurance would be required to ensure vessels traversing the straits are safe due to the 
inadequacy of strait security.13 
                                                 
8 Ian Storey, “China’s Malacca Dilemma,” China Brief 6, Issue 3 (12 April 2006): 1. 
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3686&article_id=2370974 
(accessed 11 February 2008). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Chris Rahman, “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia,” Violence at Sea: 
Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (NY: Routledge, 2007): 189. 
11 W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges,” 
The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at 
Sea, ed. Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing 
Co. Pte. Ltd., 2006): 43.  
12 Lynn D. Pullen and Scott C. Truver, “Security in the Pacific Rim: EvolvingU.S. Strategies, 
Doctrines, and Forces for Maritime Cooperation and Regional Collective Action,” The Evolving Maritime 
Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. Lawrence W. 




There are other straits in Southeast Asia through which vessels can pass between 
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, but these passages present their own sets of 
problems.  The Sunda Strait is a passage that lies between the Indonesian islands of Java 
and Sumatra.  This strait has highly irregular geographic features that make it much more 
difficult to traverse then the Strait of Malacca.  In its northern entrance, tidal streams are 
strong and oil-drilling platforms off the coast of Java can cause hazards to navigation.14  
The Lombok-Makassar-Celebes-Sulu Sea route lies in the southeastern portion of 
Southeast Asia and also has its own set of navigation hazards, as traversing it requires 
ships to pass near various small islands.  This particular route is also under conflicting 
claims by the states that adjoin it and has, in the past, been closed to international 
shipping due to naval maneuvers by states such as Indonesia.15  The larger black arrows 
in Figure 1 show the path of the Lombok-Makassar-Celebes-Sulu Sea route.  At quick 
glance one can see that the path passes by small islands and lengthens the time that would 
be required to pass from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and vice versa. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet (London: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2003), 120. 
15 Ibid., 121. 
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Figure 1.   Illustration of Malacca Strait.16 
 
2. Transnational Crime 
a. Piracy 
The Strait of Malacca has been home to a number of types of transnational 
crime, most notably piracy. The standard definition of piracy is often taken from the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and is defined as violence 
that is conducted on the high seas beyond any state’s particular territorial waters.17  
                                                 
16 Bradford, 65. After source, arrows added to indicate Lombok-Makasarr-Celebes-Sulu Sea route. 
17 Adam J. Young and Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (August 2003): 270. 
NOTE: Territorial waters extend 12NM beyond a state’s shoreline. 
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Specifically, it is any “illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, or against person or 
property on board such ship or aircraft.”18  This definition can be interpreted differently 
by different states because it does not reflect passages such as the Malacca Strait as its 
waters are not considered part of the high seas. The International Chamber of 
Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has created its own definition of 
piracy so that violent acts that occur in the strait can be considered piracy. The IMB 
defines piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to 
commit theft or any other crime with the intent or capability to use force in furtherance of 
that act.”19  
Southeast Asian governments, other than Singapore, have consistently 
denied that piracy is a problem in their region.20  However, in recent years, the region has 
accounted for nearly 50 percent of all attacks worldwide, and the waters surrounding 
Indonesia continue to be the most frequent area for recurrent piracy attacks.21  Acts of 
piracy have ranged from stealing a ship while it is anchored to the classic boarding and 
hijacking of a vessel on the high seas.22   
Piracy attacks, both actual and attempted, vary from year to year in the 
strait. At the height of the attacks in 2003 there were a total of 154 and recently in 2006 
there were a total of 71.23  Table 1 illustrates the number of attacks occurring in or 
around the Malacca Strait starting in 1994 and ending in 2006.  According to the figures 
there is a considerable increase of transnational crime between the early and late 90s.  
                                                 
18 United Nations, “Part VII,” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed 11 February 
2008). 
19 Young and Valencia, 270. 
20 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia,” The Best of Time, the Worst 
of Times, ed. Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. 
Ltd., 2005): 61. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report, UK: 
IMB, 2007. 
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The figure peaked in 2000 and declined to approximately 140 actual or attempted attacks 
in 2002.  The reasons for the increase and subsequent decrease are debatable but the 
interesting feature of this data is that after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 the numbers 
increased dramatically and did not begin to decline until the initiation of robust forms of 
multinational cooperation among the littoral states in 2004. 
The data in Table 1 would suggest that the best time to implement robust 
forms of multilateral cooperation concerning the Strait of Malacca would have been 
during the period 1997-2000 when the piracy trend shows a dramatic increase from 
previous years.  In fact, at that time there already were bilateral agreements between 
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia on maritime security but in all cases they were widely 
criticized for being only an exchange of schedules.24  As the number remained steady at a 
high level compared to previous levels, approximately 150, from year to year this would 
provide users such as the United States and Japan ammunition for calls of greater 
cooperation between the littoral states, or even more appalling to the littoral states, 
outside intervention.    
After Operation MALSINDO was instituted in 2004, it can be considered 
a success with a noticeable fall in the number of attacks the next year.  Looking at the 
trends of cooperation efforts between these states and in Southeast Asia in general it 
would almost make sense that the level of cooperation would taper off or that there would 
be no strengthening of the operation.  This is not the case and suggests that there is 
something else that is pushing the littoral states towards greater multilateral cooperation.   
                                                 
24 Carolin Liss, “The Privatization of Maritime Security – Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: 








1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year (1994-2006)
Southeast Asia Piracy Attacks
Number of Attacks
 
Table 1.   Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks25 
 
b. Maritime Terrorism 
Maritime terrorism, coupled with piracy, is an issue that consistently gets 
brought up in discussions concerning the safety of the strait from year to year though no 
incidents of maritime terrorism are known to have occurred.  Despite this, acts of 
maritime terrorism in the Strait of Malacca are possible and there are terrorists groups 
that are known to have maritime capabilities with plans to use the Strait of Malacca as a 
target.  Acts of maritime terrorism have a number of possible objectives and “may seek to 
                                                 
25 NOTE: Table 1 shows the number of actual or attempted piracy attacks in or around the Malacca 
Strait from 1994-2006.  In or around the Malacca Strait includes the following areas: Malacca Strait, 
Singapore Strait, waters of Indonesia and Malaysia.  No known acts of maritime terrorism have occurred in 
the area though it is possible that reported piracy attacks are cover for terrorist attacks or funding. 
SOURCE: Figures were compiled from the ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships Annual Report. UK: IMB, 2006 and 2007. Reports can be found at www.icc-ccs.org. 
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cause human casualties, economic losses, environmental damage, or other negative 
impacts, alone or in combination, of minor or major consequence.”26 
There have been a rash of maritime terrorist attacks elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, and these spurred concern among users of the Malacca Strait. In 2000 the 
Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix was bombed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
killing forty people and wounding fifty more.27  In 2000 a suicide boat in Aden attacked 
the USS COLE and the Abu Sayyaf Group has kidnapped a number of Western tourists 
from resorts in Malaysia in 2000 and the Philippines in 2001.28  While maritime terrorist 
attacks have not occurred in the Strait of Malacca, Jemaah Islamiyah is known to have 
planned to attack U.S. Navy vessels visiting and passing through it.29  Many security 
analysts point to these straits as a possible focus of various terrorist groups with maritime 
capabilities.30  In June 2005, based on their assessment of the Strait of Malacca Lloyd’s 
Joint War Committee added the Strait of Malacca to its list of dangerous waters.31 
3. Littoral State Cooperation 
The littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have recently begun to 
actively engage in maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Strait in 2004 on a 
trilateral basis, more so than previous cooperation arrangements.  This runs counter to the 
norms of the greater Southeast Asian region.   By being able to deduce and determine 
what has allowed for increased cooperation between these states it may point to how they 
may cooperate more in the future and reduce the instances of piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca.  Researching this question may also give rise to understanding how these 
                                                 
26 Paul W. Parformak and John Frittelli, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection 
Priorities (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 9 January 2007), 3. 
27 Bradford, “The Growing Prospects For Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 67. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Parformak, 4. 
30 Ibid. 
31 The Growing Menace of Piracy, “Taking Cover – and Joint Action,” Zurich Financial Services 
(March 2006) 
http://www.zurich.com/main/productsandsolutions/industryinsight/2006/march2006/industryinsight200603
01_000.htm (accessed 11 February 2008). 
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Southeast Asian states may cooperate in other areas of terrorism, piracy or insurgencies 
more generally in a regional context.  Along these same lines, this research may help to 
explain what can be done to increase the levels of defense cooperation by other groups of 
states or regions throughout the world or how to explain the propensity for other states to 
cooperate or not to cooperate.  
The question of why the littoral states have begun cooperating is also important in 
determining if vessels transiting the strait are safe.  As one of the most important transit 
passages in the world, the unimpeded transit of merchant vessels is important to the 
international community, especially to those states who rely on food, energy and goods 
that are moved by way of the sea through the Malacca Strait.  Regional states in East and 
Southeast Asia that have specific interests in the unimpeded traffic of the strait include 
China, Taiwan, Japan and the littoral states of Southeast Asia including Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore.  Because of the importance of the strait, terrorist organizations 
may use this particular high-density area of shipping as a focal point in future terrorist 
acts using fear or coercion as a method for getting what they want or in order to make a 
statement.  Piracy groups may also continue to use the strait as a method for procuring 
goods as the strait provides an ample opportunity for their seizure.  From a policy 
perspective it is important to understand if defense cooperation between the littoral states 
is working because if it were not then it would require possible outside intervention 
because of the importance of the Malacca Strait. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis seeks to explain why Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have begun 
to take measures to increase the level of maritime security in the Malacca Straits where in 
the past cooperation was either negligible or non-existent.  To be able to do this type of 
research I have conducted an analysis of the levels of cooperation between the three 
states in the pre and post 9/11 periods. The events of 9/11 were important in themselves 




perceptions of terrorism and levels of cooperation against it increased.  Thus, it would not 
be surprising if 9/11 marked a turning point in cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Singapore.   
The historical analysis will concentrate on cooperation aspects of maritime 
security in the Malacca Strait but will also include an analysis of other types of historical 
cooperation including border region and information sharing cooperation as well as 
cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the U.S. led 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Exercises (CARAT).  In researching the 
areas and levels of cooperation I intend to describe what the environment was like prior 
to 9/11 and what has changed over time in the state, regional and international contexts.  
The analysis of this topic will be given in five chapters. 
Chapter I has three major functions.  The first is to explain the purpose and 
importance of the research behind the thesis.  The second is to give a brief description of 
the importance of the Strait of Malacca.  The final function is to give the reader a sense of 
the scope of the piracy problem and a sense that acts of maritime terrorism are 
possibilities within this area. This provides a foundation for exploring the types of 
cooperation in which the littoral states have engaged before and after 9/11 in the Straits 
of Malacca. In addition, it provides a basis for examining the reasons that extra-regional 
states might exert pressure on the littoral states to engage in more robust forms of 
cooperation, and why they might want to intervene themselves on a more unilateral level 
to secure the straits.   
Chapter II delves into the historical bases of cooperation between the littoral 
states prior to 9/11 including where the different cooperation norms within the region 
originated. The third chapter focuses on cooperation since 9/11.  The fourth chapter 
analyzes the various maritime assets of each state: how they have been used, how they 
are being used presently, and what the future of maritime assets is in the region for 
prosecuting and deterring acts of piracy.  The conclusion will bring all the pieces together 




facilitating cooperation among the littoral states on this issue?  It will also provide policy 
recommendations to the United States on how to promote greater cooperation among the 
littoral states.  
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II. COOPERATION PRIOR TO 9/11 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter will address the historical measures of cooperation by the littoral 
states prior to 9/11 and attempt to address why there is an aversion to multilateral forms 
of cooperation within this region as a whole.  It will begin by analyzing why the littoral 
states act the way they do when it comes to issues of outside intervention and multilateral 
cooperation in general.  To explain this phenomena a brief account of the region’s 
experiences with outside powers and intra-state relationships will be discussed as well as 
the establishment of ASEAN and the norms associated with it.  
 The chapter will then delve into the types of individual, bilateral and multilateral 
measures taken to secure the straits prior to 9/11 and will also address other more 
prevalent forms of cooperation among the littoral states in this period.  The reader will 
notice that there are instances when the littoral states have cooperated in a joint forum to 
combat transnational crime in the Strait of Malacca but can recall that such measures 
prior to 9/11 can be interpreted as ineffective based on the increase in the number of 
piracy attacks leading up to 2001. 
B. HINDRANCES TO COOPERATION 
 The littoral states have had a number of reasons for an aversion to cooperating on 
a multilateral or joint basis.  Two important aspects of their history make it difficult for 
them to cooperate with not only one another, but with outside states and organizations as 
well.  These two aspects are the exploitation that they faced prior to and during their 
nascent statehood as well as the norms that they have adopted from organizations, 
particularly from ASEAN and the “ASEAN way.”  Additional reasons are that the 
Southeast Asian states have continued “to see threat-oriented cooperation as unduly 
provocative to potential adversaries” such as the PRC, that such cooperation has been 
seen as providing limited value given the weak self-defense capabilities of each 
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individual state and that the degree of standardization of equipment and interoperability 
required for multilateral cooperation efforts are lacking.32   
The Southeast Asian states are still developing and they do not have robust 
militaries.  A consequence of their developing status is that the military equipment that 
they have acquired is generally not produced by state or regional industrial sectors and 
makes interoperability among their own pieces of equipment difficult.  The littoral states 
have had to buy military equipment from other states willing to sell it to them.  In many 
cases they have platforms that are procured from multiple countries such as the United 
States, Russia and European states that cause interoperability problems.  These types of 
problems would make it difficult for platforms within their own militaries to be 
interoperable let alone with another country’s military.  This issue will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
Historical intra-state relations have also raised suspicions among the littoral states 
that hinder their ability to trust one another to enter into multilateral security agreements.  
In examining these reasons, that the states of Southeast Asia have norms, historical issues 
and an aversion to being seen as adversarial, we find that constructivism and realism, two 
paradigms of political science theory, can give us insight into why these states have not 
cooperated on more of a multilateral basis. 
Constructivists would argue that the designation of a common other is important 
in generating a collective identity.33  There was no such identity for the littoral states 
prior to 9/11 because the threats that could be possible rallying mechanisms were internal 
and threatening to each state on an individual or bilateral basis.  There is a collective 
identity among the littoral states but it is based on a common history derived from 
colonialism that has resulted in an aversion to influence by foreign powers within their 
sovereign territory.  Because there was no collective identity based on a common other 
there was not necessarily a need for greater forms of cooperation among them when it 
came to matters of security in the period prior to 9/11. 
                                                 
32 Amitav Acharya,  Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem 
of Regional Order (NY: Routledge, 2001): 151. 
33 Ibid., 308. 
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Where constructivists make arguments based on norms and identity realists 
concern themselves with security and make assessments of states based on it.34  In 
Southeast Asia we can see a realist rational for an aversion to multilateral security 
cooperation.  If these states decided to enter into a multilateral security framework this 
may seem threatening to other regional states such as the PRC or even Vietnam prior to 
its induction into ASEAN.  These other states could potentially see a multilateral security 
framework as being directed towards them.  As a result these states may begin building 
up their own military forces or entering into security cooperation frameworks of their 
own to counter the threat, perceived or real.  This type of activity is called a security 
dilemma in international relations theory.  The idea is that as a state takes measures to 
increase its own security, such as building up military capabilities or entering into 
security arrangements, other states will see this as a decrease in their own security 
because in realism security is a zero sum game.35  These states will therefore try to 
increase their own security to counter through increasing their own military capabilities 
or entering into their own security frameworks.36  This type of activity can go back and 
forth leading each state to become more paranoid and this is the type of environment that 
the Southeast Asian states did not want by engaging in multilateral security cooperation.  
The ASEAN states did feel that this type of spiraling could occur and did not create a 
traditional security community in order to maintain a nonprovocative posture against the 
Indochinese states and in order to regulate great power rivalry in the region.37 
1. Past Relationships 
Each littoral state has historically had different but relatively similar experiences 
with foreign powers that have resulted in similar attitudes towards their own statehood 
and the manner in which they interact with foreign states and organizations.  These types 
                                                 
34 NOTE: For literature on realism see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (NY: 
McGraw Hill, 1979) and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (NY: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2001). 
35 Mearsheimer, 36. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or “Defense 
Community?” Pacific Affairs 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 162. 
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of experiences have led them to develop a sense of paranoia among them.  The history of 
the states in the region as once colonial possessions of other states has, in a way, 
intensified their concerns over protection of the domains that are theirs.38  These domains 
include the maritime domain. 
The littoral states have been historically exploited by the likes of the PRC, Japan 
and other imperially oriented Western states.  These experiences have magnified their 
natural sensitivity over encroachment of their sovereignty by outside powers.39  This has 
a direct relationship with the Strait of Malacca and is an important piece in understanding 
why the littoral states have been so adverse to accept help in forms other than economic 
aid or military training.  Many of their misgivings originate with their past colonial 
heritages, with the PRC and Japan specifically, spilling over into other foreign entities 
and states. 
In its dynastic periods the PRC thought of itself as the Middle Kingdom and a 
nation under heaven.  Based on this it established and maintained tributary relationships 
with its neighbors.40  In a brief period from 1405 to 1433 China sent vast fleets under the 
control of Zheng He to Southeast Asia to collect tribute for the Ming Empire.41  Such a 
region as Southeast Asia was thought to be able to function in a satisfactory fashion if it 
were incorporated into a tributary system with China.42  Not only did Imperial China 
exact tribute from Southeast Asia in its early history but in their early periods of 
statehood as well. “During the Cold War, the PRC supported communist parties or 
insurgencies in every Southeast Asian state with the exception of Singapore and 
Brunei.”43 
                                                 
38 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “Maritime Issues in Asia: The Problem of Adolescence,” Asian Security 
Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2002): 430.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 130. 
41 Bruce Vaughn and Wayne M. Morrison, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and 
Implications for the United States (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 4 April 2006), 5. 
42 Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (St Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin 
2000), 28. 
43 Vaughn and Morrison, 5. 
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During the Second World War, Japan was also heavily involved in Southeast 
Asia. The Japanese state systematically occupied much of Southeast Asia because it 
believed that it was an area rich in raw materials and resources it needed to sustain its war 
effort and for continued economic growth.44  Japanese rule in this period has been 
considered ruthless in many parts of the region.  Most notably the Japanese exacted 
“savage vengeance” on the Chinese members of Southeast Asia in Singapore and 
Malaya.45 
2. Intra-State Relationships 
 The relationships among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have not been the 
best of relationships and contribute to the absence of multilateral security cooperation 
frameworks.  Indonesia and Malaysia have had difficulties among themselves and 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have ongoing issues between them.  These types of 
antagonistic intra-state relationships are not healthy or conducive to cooperation on a 
multilateral basis. 
 In 1963 Indonesia launched a campaign against Malaysia called Konfrontasi or 
armed confrontation.46 This campaign was born out of Indonesia’s objections to elements 
of the newly created Malayan Federation believing it was a neo-colonialist plot that 
ignored the wishes of the people of Borneo, specifically the provinces of Sabah and 
Sarawak, partly for domestic and territorial reasons.47  Indonesia sent guerilla fighters 
into Sabah and Sarawak in 1963 and not only broke off diplomatic relations with Britain 
and Malaysia but also withdrew itself from the United Nations.48  Eventually the 
                                                 
44 James L. McClain, A Modern History of Japan (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 476-477.  
45 Osborne, 140. 
46 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2005): 53. 
47 Ibid and Norman G. Owen, ed., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2005): 415. 
48 Owen, 433. 
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Konfrontasi would end a few years later but this relationship would have lasting effects 
as it became deeply embedded in Malaysia’s national psyche.49 
 Malaysia and Singapore have also experienced hostilities between them.  These 
hostilities lie in material interests and in ethnic rivalries against the Muslim dominated 
Malaysian political party and the Chinese dominated political party in Singapore.50  
Issues between them include Singapore’s land reclamation project in the Johor Straits, 
Singapore’s water supply and the territorial issue of Pedra Branca Islet.51   
Singapore had begun to reclaim land through its land reclamation project and has 
added 18 percent to its territory with another 15 percent projected in the future.52  The 
projects aim is to widen Changi Airport, Jurong and Pasir Panjang of Singapore.53 
Malaysia objects to the project citing environmental and safety of navigation concerns.54  
Malaysia contends that the project is a way for Singapore to prevent deep draft vessels 
from traveling to its Pasir Gudang and Tanjung Pelapas ports in its southern state of 
Johor but Singapore believes that Malaysia’s objections are an effort for it to curtail its 
own development.55   
Indonesia also objects to the project.  One of Indonesia’s islands that marks part 
of its territorial boundaries with Singapore is Nipah island.  Over time the island has 
begun to become submerged by water as a result of Singapore’s land reclamation 
project.56 Indonesia contends that if the island becomes completely submerged it would 
alter the international boundary between it and Singapore in favor of the later.57   
                                                 
49 Chin Kin Wah, “The Shaping of Strategic Cultures,” Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security, ed. 
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51 Ibid. 
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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EG31Ae01.htm (accessed 12 April 2008). 
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The water issue lies first in the fact that Singapore’s primary source of water is 
Malaysia and in two agreements on the terms and pricing of the supply of untreated water 
that were agreed to in 1961 and 1962 that run until 2011 and 2061 respectively.58  These 
agreements became part of the 1965 Separation Agreement when Singapore became 
independent from Malaysia.59  Malaysia believes that it has a right to review the price of 
water and has also raised questions as to the renewal of the agreements in the future.60  
Per the agreements prices can actually be revised in line with various factors including 
the purchasing power of money as well as the costs of power and materials to supply the 
water.61  Singapore, on the other hand, believes that the fact that Malaysia has made this 
an issue and has threatened its future supply of water is a cause of concern and has made 
it a question on the very existence of the Singaporean state.62 
The islet Pedra Branca (white rock) is a contentious issue between Singapore and 
Malaysia.  The Singapore government has administered the island as part of its territory 
since the 1840s but in 1979 Malaysia published a map with Pedra Branca as being part of 
its Johor state despite earlier maps as late as 1974 clearly depicting the islet belonging to 
Singapore.63   The small island that is composed mostly of rocks is important to Malaysia 
because it is important for Malaysia to maintain what it considers its territorial 
integrity.64  In 1989 there was a naval confrontation between the two states after which 
Singapore suggested that the matter be taken to the International Court of Justice.65  Not 
respecting the status quo until a judgment is reached Malaysia has continued to conduct 
naval patrols in the area citing its rights of surveillance in its territorial waters.66 
                                                 
58 Lee Poh Onn, “The Water Issue Between Singapore and Malaysia: No Solution in Sight?” 
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60 Weatherbee, 125. 
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62 Weatherbee, 125. 
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3. The ASEAN Way 
Historical cooperation between the littoral states has also been hampered because 
shared history of the littoral states has led to the creation of institutions such as ASEAN 
that champion sovereignty and non-interference.  The concern that the littoral states share 
over sovereignty hamper the creation of multilateral measures of security cooperation in 
the Strait of Malacca because these types of concerns not only encourages each 
individual state to send its own Navy on patrols and survey missions but it also makes it 
difficult for these states to accept joint schemes of security cooperation.67  This is most 
evident in the period prior to 9/11. 
ASEAN was created on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok when officials from 
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines signed a declaration 
establishing the association.68  The importance of ASEAN as a regional organization in 
Southeast Asia cannot be underestimated or understated.  Its principles, norms and ideals 
have, since its inception, shaped the greater principles, norms and ideals of many of its 
member states, notably the littoral states of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
“The ASEAN way” was an outgrowth of the greater principles of the association 
and can be characterized by two Malay terms called musyawarah (consultation) and 
mufakat (consensus).69  It consists of a step-by-step dialogue that members use to help 
confidence building among its members as well as to help avoid conflict among them.70 
In ASEAN, the ASEAN way is the prevalent construct for conducting business.  It 
includes norms of non-interference by extra-regional powers, the idea of sovereignty and 
the idea that regional problems should be handled at a regional level.71  These norms can  
                                                 
67 Blanchard, 131. 
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be cited as reasons for why Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have chosen individual 
and bilateral frameworks as their preferred method of solving problems with regard to the 
Strait of Malacca.   
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the declaration giving birth to 
ASEAN are also important pieces of the ASEAN identity that can help explain the littoral 
states’ aversion to joint efforts of maritime security cooperation in the Strait of Malacca.  
The TAC was signed in Indonesia on 24 February 1976 and embodies many of the ideals 
that ASEAN stands for.  Chapter 1, Article 2 of the TAC specifically states that  
The High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following 
fundamental principles:  
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations;  
b. The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external 
influence, subversion or coercion;  
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;  
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;  
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;  
f. Effective cooperation among themselves.72  
Article 2 of the TAC embodies the ASEAN way and gives us another glimpse into why 
the littoral states are averse to cooperating on any matters dealing with security, 
especially in the period directly following the creation of ASEAN and the singing of the 
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created and embodies the norms of ASEAN.  The 1967 Bangkok Declaration talks about 
a prosperous and peaceful community in Southeast Asia and promoting peace and 
stability within the region.73 
 The resulting norms and ideals represented in the ASEAN way have made it 
difficult or taboo for multilateral forms of security partnerships in the region. ASEAN as 
a group has been a well-known multinational body that has made little headway in actual 
action on any real issue with the exception of ASEAN’s efforts to remove Vietnamese 
occupiers from Cambodia.  Many of ASEAN’s meetings have produced results in the 
form of declarations and statements with no real teeth or enforcement mechanism behind 
them.  Security issues have had the same fate.  Indeed, prior to 9/11, ASEAN in fact did 
not single out terrorism as a topic of special importance.74  Instead piracy, maritime 
terrorism, arms smuggling, etc. have been placed under the term transnational crime. 
Historically, the states of Southeast Asia have engaged in individual and bilateral 
measures of preserving and maintaining security.  This could be for a variety of reasons 
but the general consensus is that they have limited themselves to these types of security 
arrangements because of their “preoccupation with domestic stability, their fear of the 
attendant dangers of being embroiled in superpower rivalry, the futility of an alliance in 
view of the military weakness of the ASEAN states and the flexibility and perceived 
advantages of bilateral cooperation over alliance.”75  This type of omni-balancing, a term 
denoting the idea that states balance against more then just other states and their military 
capabilities, has prevented the formation of traditional security ties and pacts despite 
extra-regional and regional security issues.76  Southeast Asia’s “rejection of military 
pacts has been maintained despite concerns; evident from its response to the emergence 
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of a Soviet-Vietnamese security partnership in the early 1980s.”77  Despite this 
threatening partnership that developed in the period prior to 9/11 Southeast Asian states 
maintained the status quo and pursued security measures on an individual and bilateral 
basis. 
C. INDIVIDUAL AND BILATERAL MEASURES 
 The littoral states have traditionally pursued individual and bilateral rather than 
multilateral measures of security.  One reason for this is that many Southeast Asian 
terrorist groups are domestic in nature and often represent movements with primarily 
domestic goals that give little need for cooperation by the littoral states on a multilateral 
basis.78  Individual, national level measures have been initiated prior to the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 but because of the low importance placed on maritime security, and 
security in general, prior to 9/11 there are not many instances of individual national level 
measures in this period pertaining directly to the maritime domain.  There was also little 
pressure given to maritime security in the Strait of Malacca region in general prior to 
9/11 that would give these states an incentive to pursue multilateral levels of cooperation.   
Singapore has traditionally been the more active littoral state when it comes to 
issues dealing with security resulting from its small size and greater perceptions of 
security threats.  Piracy and maritime terrorism have never been high on the list of 
priorities of Indonesia because of its limited resources that are available to deal with a 
whole range of internal matters, most notably the separatist movement on Aceh, a special 
territory of Indonesia located on the northern tip on the island of Sumatra.79  Until 
Malaysia experienced a criminal act that hit close to home it too, like Indonesia, was 
generally unconcerned with maritime issues of transnational crime.  Malaysia’s stance 
changed after the Abu Sayyaf Group kidnapped twenty-one Malaysian and foreign 
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tourists from Sipadan, a resort island off the coast of Sabah in 2000.80  This act did not 
necessarily change Malaysia’s mind or make it more concerned with piracy or terrorism 
in the Strait of Malacca but the terrorist act did influence its own security concerns more 
generally in preventing intrusions in its sovereign territory by foreign groups.81 
In 2000 the Royal Malaysia Marine Police (RMMP) established a special anti-
piracy task force with sixty marine police officers trained to form Malaysia’s marine 
police tactical commando unit.82  These units were supported with the immediate 
acquisition of 20 fast strike craft and 4 rigid hull inflatable boats.83  The special task force 
is accompanied by Malaysia’s Special Action Forces and 69 Commando Unit and is 
deployed in the Straits of Malacca.84 These acquisitions and training programs 
demonstrate how Malaysia has placed an increased level of importance in the security of 
the maritime areas surrounding it and can be attributed to an increase in its threat 
perception resulting from the kidnappings from Sabah. 
Bilateral levels of cooperation prior to 9/11 are more robust then the individual 
level of combating transnational crime.  The following are a list of security and defense 
ties the littoral states have become involved in on a bilateral basis.  They include border 
region cooperation, intelligence sharing, frequent senior-level official visits, provision of 
combat training facilities and cooperation in the defense industrial sector.85  While it 
would make sense that such measures be extended to a multilateral framework they 
generally did not prior to 9/11 with a few exceptions. 
Because of the historically recent nature of modern statehood of the Southeast 
Asia states, border region cooperation has been the foundation of the bilateral security 
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arrangements found between the states of Southeast Asia.86  Among the more prevalent 
types of bilateral cooperation regimes border region cooperation provided the ASEAN 
states with an ability to counter what were their most prominent threats including 
insurgencies and illegal activities such as drug smuggling and piracy within each states 
own borders.  Security cooperation at the bilateral framework level was comfortable for 
the littoral states and provided a predictable and comfortable way for these states to 
interact with one another.  In the early 90s Malaysia’s Defense Minister, Najib Tun 
Razak summed the situation of bilateral cooperation up best when he said: 
ASEAN doesn’t need a military pact.  ASEAN military forces are familiar 
with each other on a bilateral basis.  To me, that’s good enough.  Because 
when you have a pact, people will ask: Who is it directed at?  So it raises a 
lot of questions. So rather than alarming anyone or sending a wrong 
signal, it is better for us to continue on the same basis because we have 
been so successful.87 
This quote demonstrates the interesting thought processes of the leaders of the littoral 
states and Southeast Asia more generally.  In an effort not to alarm neighbors these states 
have taken a decidedly more safe approach even though has not the best course of action. 
Along with border region and intelligence cooperation, cooperation at the 
maritime level, though limited, was also present prior to 9/11. Indonesia-Singapore 
coordinated patrols in the Strait of Malacca were established in 1992 and the Indonesia-
Malaysia Maritime Operation Planning Team was established in 1992 as well.88  The 
planning team was charged with formulating and carrying out joint anti-piracy patrols in 
the Strait of Malacca but like other similar maritime security cooperation measures there 
was a strictly “hands-off” protocol when it came to the issue of hot pursuit.89  The fact 
that they are also labeled coordinated vice joint is also an important point.  Coordinated 
patrols convey the point that these states are only working together through limited levels 
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of communication.  Joint patrols would be more robust and would require that the assets 
used for the patrols work side by side, not just telling the other participant when it would 
be in a certain position or how long that asset would be on station.  While these measures 
demonstrate an increase of cooperation between the littoral states these efforts remain 
only slightly effective.  Under the 1992 bilateral agreement between Indonesia and 
Malaysia “each state patrols within its own territorial seas, but the patrols coordinated by 
keeping the other state informed.”90  Keeping each other informed is important but the 
overall effectiveness of this type of cooperation is limited. 
D. MULTILATERAL LEVEL MEASURES 
Multilateral level measures were present prior to 9/11 but often these multilateral 
measures often involved outside powers such as the United States and involved the 
traditional information sharing and training.  Efforts to create organizations or 
mechanisms to bring together the littoral states for joint maritime security cooperation in 
the Strait of Malacca were limited in this period. ASEAN was in a nascent state prior to 
9/11 just as the littoral states and was used as a forum for establishing guidelines on how 
its members operated and dealt with issues in their region and resulted in a low level of 
effectiveness in tackling the issue of piracy and maritime terrorism in the Strait of 
Malacca.  The Strait Reporting System (STRAITREP) was implemented prior to 9/11 but 
kept with tradition and only involved information sharing on items such as the number of 
ships passing through the strait as well as the course, speed and position of transiting 
vessels to ensure safety of navigation. 
1. ASEAN 
 ASEAN cooperation in its early years was characteristic of the existing Southeast 
Asian political environment in that the overriding concerns with ASEAN’s members 
originated from post-colonial ambiguity and the Cold War environment resulting in a 
concerted effort in protecting their national integrity and interests from outside 
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influences.91  Many of the ASEAN member states were also in conflict with one another 
and as a result of this environment the “ASEAN way” emerged as a method of 
cooperation as the original members desired to create a mechanism which would 
contribute to the peace and stability in intra-regional relations.92 
ASEAN did conduct a conference on transnational crime in Manila in December 
1997 that resulted in the ASEAN Declaration of transnational crime that instituted a 
series of regular meeting at the ministerial level.93  These meetings, also referred to the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), have the purpose of 
facilitating coordination among the members of ASEAN but does not establish any real 
form of actual security cooperation among them in any case, transnational crime or 
otherwise, prior to 9/11.  Furthermore, a lack of cooperation prior to 9/11 by the littoral 
states and ASEAN as a whole resulted from the contentious nature of the Strait of 
Malacca from 1965 to 1982.94  Traffic separation schemes themselves, the “highways” of 
the seas whose purpose is to ensure safety of navigation in areas that have especially high 
chances for collisions at sea, were not adopted until 1960.  Regulation of the seas has 
come a long way since then with the implementation of the UNCLOS but in the early 
period of littoral state sovereignty, sea control and safety were still issues that concerned 
both users of various transit passages as well as the states adjacent to them because of a 
lack of regulation and fear of great power influence in what was perceived as a state’s 
own territory. 
 From 1992-2001 ASEAN entered a new arena of security cooperation.  The end 
of the Cold War represented a major watershed with the end of superpower rivalry and 
the vacating of once strategic areas.95  In an ASEAN declaration signed in Singapore in 
1992 AEAN acknowledged, for the first time, that regional security cooperation was  
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important in light of the political and economic changes resulting from the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and indicated that its members engage in new areas of cooperation in 
security matters.96 
2. STRAITREP 
In 1998 there was an information sharing operation started by Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore called the STRAITREP, a mandatory ship reporting system in the Malacca 
Straits.97  Coupled with the Automated Identification System (AIS) that has become a 
requirement for vessels traversing the high seas the STRAITREP represents an effort to 
increase maritime cooperation in the strait but does not represent a necessarily substantial 
effort.  AIS is a shipboard system that broadcasts information to vessels and stations 
carrying the AIS with information such as course, speed, position and vessel name.  The 
STRAITREP effort is centered on information and does not constitute an expansion of 
security cooperation among the states.  STRAITREP reporting requirements are similar 
to AIS and include the vessel’s name, position, course, speed, notification and description 
of hazardous cargo, sustained defects or damage, and notification of pollutants or 
dangerous cargo lost overboard.  Many other ocean transit areas such as the Panama 
Canal require the same type of information prior to a vessel being allowed to traverse the 
passage. 
3. CARAT 
The United States has always held the safe passage of SLOCs around the world as 
an important piece of freedom and safety of navigation at sea.  In 1995 the United States 
began exercises known as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT).98  
Since its inception CARAT exercises have been based on bilateral training between the 
United States and some other Southeast Asian state.  Participants usually change on a 
yearly basis but Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have participated in various exercises 
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with the United States including amphibious landings and maritime interdiction 
operations.99  Other piracy and maritime terrorism specific exercises were not conducted 
until only recently in the post 9/11 period.  On many occasions there are observers from 
the militaries of other Southeast Asian states on U.S. vessels to observe the training 
exercises with their neighboring states.   
4. Japan and Southeast Asia 
 Japan has long been a proponent of increasing maritime security measures in 
Southeast Asia because of its concerns of transnational crime in the Strait of Malacca.  
Because it has traditionally had to rely on the efforts of the littoral states in securing the 
strait Japan has felt compelled to help in securing the strait.  Since the mid 90s concerns 
over transnational crime, specifically piracy, have led Japan to focus their foreign policy 
in the region by leading a regional effort to eradicate the piracy problem in Southeast 
Asia.100  As a result of their concern, Japan has forwarded a number of proposals for 
securing the strait.  At one level there are bilateral efforts that Japan has conducted with 
the littoral states that involve the Japanese Coast Guard conducting various joint training 
exercises with the Littoral States and various aid programs to help equip the maritime 
forces of various Southeast Asian states.101  There are also various programs that Japan 
has tried to institute at the multilateral level. 
 These multilateral programs that were suggested prior to 9/11 include the Ocean 
Peace Keeping (OPK) concept, the regional coast guard body proposal and the 
Organization for the Cooperative Management of Safety in the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore.  All three of these multilateral level proposals failed for different reasons.  
The OPK concept was a proposal first brought up in the 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit by 
Japan and envisioned a standing maritime security force that would be composed of 
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regional naval assets but failed because of its radical nature.102  The regional coast guard 
body proposal was similar to the OPK concept and failed for similar reasons with only 
non-obligatory endorsements of cooperation being reached.103  The Organization for the 
Cooperative Management of Safety in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was a 
proposal to share the financial burdens of navigation safety, preventing pollution and 
fighting piracy by users and coastal states such as Malaysia and Indonesia.  The members 
who were envisioned to carry out this proposal rejected it.104 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Prior to 9/11 the littoral states have marginally increased their levels of 
cooperation but they continue to remain low in this period.  ASEAN, the forum in which 
these states conduct much of their regional business continues to remain as a loose and 
informal grouping in many respects.105  The littoral states prior to 9/11 have had many 
reasons to limit their multilateral cooperation efforts.  Negative relationships with 
colonial powers have led them not to trust outsiders and their negative relationships 
among themselves have led them to not trust their regional neighbors.  As developing 
nations they do not necessarily have the resources to have a robust military force capable 
of interoperability and even if they did I contend that there has been an aversion to 
military buildups and security cooperation frameworks in this region because these states 
do not want to risk the possibility of a spiraling security dilemma.  Strict adherence to the 
norms of ASEAN in the form of the ASEAN way has also led these states to be more 
individualistic.  These reasons, along with the littoral states’ lack of a perceived common 
threat has led these states to deal with the issues of piracy and maritime terrorism more 
on an individual and bilateral, rather than collective or multilateral, level.   
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ASEAN, STRAITREP, CARAT and working with Japan demonstrate the limited 
amount of cooperation in a multilateral framework prior to 9/11.  Despite this, the levels 
of cooperation have begun to slowly expand as tensions become between these states 
become more relaxed and a greater unity of purpose is achieved.  In the post 9/11 period, 
as collective threat perceptions emerge and become more salient, coupled with increasing 
international pressure from states such as Japan and the United States the chances for 
greater cooperation have a significantly greater possibility of occurring.  In the following 
chapter the evidence shows that this is in fact the case.   
 32
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 33
III. POST 9/11 COOPERATION 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Many of the reasons for constrained and limited forms of historical cooperation 
between the littoral states remain important in the post 9/11 period but they appear to be 
subsiding enough to allow multilateral forms of security cooperation.  In Southeast Asia 
there has historically been a lack of importance placed on piracy and maritime terrorism 
in general.  As a result there has been an aversion to cooperating on these types of issues.  
The perception of what constitutes terrorism and piracy is an important factor that has 
historically undermined overall security cooperation between the littoral states.  If the 
states do not have overlapping interests or understandings of the problem then no real, 
collective solution can be brokered.  The events of 9/11 and other acts of terrorism in this 
period have caused the littoral states to change their perceptions on different issues that 
were believed to not be problems for them in the past.  In this period there has been a 
noticeable difference in the actions taken by them compared to the pre 9/11 period.  The 
littoral states’ easing of tensions with regional and extra-regional states, changing 
perceptions of the transnational crime problem and foreign pressure from states such as 
the United States and Japan have led them to increase their individual and cooperative 
measures against piracy and maritime terrorism.  What is more, they have also begun to 
cooperate in a way that has been uncommon in Southeast Asia with the implementation 
of Operation MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) in 2004, a cooperative 
framework among the littoral states to combat piracy in and around the Strait of Malacca.  
B. AN EASING OF TENSIONS AND 9/11 
 The end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11 are important pieces of the puzzle 
in determining why the littoral states are beginning to cooperate on security matters in a 
multilateral forum when it comes to issues of the transnational crime.  During the Cold 
War a divide over communism in Southeast Asia hampered security cooperation but after 
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the Cold War these types of divisions were no longer as prevalent.106  We can also find 
that without a communist threat to place much energy towards more attention could be 
paid towards issues of transnational crime such as piracy.107  The end of the Cold War 
began the push that helped shift security priorities for these states.  The events of 9/11 
pushed it even further and while it is not the entire reason why the littoral states have 
begun security cooperation it was an important catalyst. 
The events of 9/11 and its aftermath can be considered one of the defining events 
of the 21st century.  Four airplanes were hijacked by Al-Qaeda terrorists and subsequently 
used as missiles against targets in the U.S.  Three of the four were successful in reaching 
their targets.  Prior to this event many in the international community were unsure as to 
what the post Cold War world would be like and enemies of the state were difficult to 
identify.  One result of 9/11 was that it created an identifiable enemy for the United 
States and the rest of the world, specifically the western world, to unite against.  This 
unifying effect of 9/11 has also spilled over into other areas of the world as well, 
including Southeast Asia, although the scope or breadth that it has affected states like the 
United States is not present.  Motivating factors for the unifying effect, if this effect is 
seen in other states like Southeast Asia, may be all together different.  Instead of unifying 
against a common enemy as the United States has these particular states are under 
pressure from the U.S. to be allies in its Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
1. Regional Implications of 9/11 
Southeast Asia, like the rest of the world was affected by 9/11.  In regional 
organizations such as ASEAN, terrorism itself was for the first time, in many respects, 
identified as a problem that should be dealt with by its members and together as a group.  
Each individual state has also made concerted efforts to step up in helping with the 
GWOT.  In 2001 for example a plan by the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia to ambush a  
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visiting U.S. vessel was disrupted by a Special Branch of Malaysia and in early 2002 an 
Al-Qaeda plan to attack a U.S. ship docked in Singapore was disrupted by Singaporean 
intelligence.108   
While 9/11 is a specific turning point for the U.S. in bringing about the GWOT 
and the reorganization of various U.S. departments under the Department of Homeland 
Security the littoral states did not go to such great lengths in the aftermath of 9/11.  This 
is because of the same basic reasons that they have not moved forward on maritime 
security cooperation in the Strait of Malacca in the pre 9/11 period.  The issue of 
terrorism in general and maritime terrorism specifically was not really an issue close to 
home because there was no real imminent threat with the exception of minor domestic 
insurgencies in Malaysia and Indonesia.  Many people have written or spoken about the 
possible nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism but when it comes down to it there 
is little to no hard evidence or credible indications to suggest that this type of threat is 
imminent.109  The possibility that a nexus exists is enough for states finding the straits 
important to push the littoral states to do more. 
In Southeast Asia 9/11 has had a type of magnifying effect on the Strait of 
Malacca.  The U.S. has gone as far to say that Southeast Asia is the second front of the 
GWOT because of the presence of radical Islamist groups in the region.  While a nexus 
between piracy and maritime terrorism has not been specifically identified the perceived 
possibility of such an occurrence has increased, as terrorists appear to be capitalizing on 
warfare that strikes at the weak points of their enemy.  In the period following 9/11 the 
perception of piracy and maritime terrorism by the littoral states, specifically Malaysia 
and Indonesia, turned from ambivalence to acceptance that there is in fact a problem.  
There were a number of events that hit close to home that may be likened to 9/11 and its 
effect on the collective psyche of the peoples of the western world.   
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In December 2001, the M/V Kalifornia was bombed transporting Christians in 
Indonesia’s Maluku Archipelago, an island formation which bears east of the Strait of 
Malacca.110  In October 2002 the M/V Limburg was struck in the Arabian Sea carrying 
crude oil from Iran to Malaysia and on the 12th of the same month there was a triple 
terrorist bombing in Bali, Indonesia.111  In August 2003 the Jakarta Marriott was bombed 
and coupled with the bombings in Bali over 200 people were killed making them the 
worst terrorist acts in the region’s history.112  The bombing of the Limburg demonstrated 
that maritime terrorism was targeting maritime trade and the Bali bombings brought the 
issue of terrorism close to home in the heart of Southeast Asia.  Each act, when analyzed 
together, has significantly altered the perception of maritime terrorism and piracy and has 
brought these issues to the forefront of interaction between the littoral states.  Though 
some Southeast Asian officials remain in denial, maritime terrorism is seen as a very 
dangerous threat and terrorism in general has become the most important security issue in 
the region.113  The Bali and Jakarta bombings themselves heralded unprecedented levels 
of cooperation among regional and foreign law enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia 
and was reinforced with subsequent bombings in 2004 and 2005 at the Australian 
embassy in Jakarta and Bali.114 
C. POST 9/11 MEASURES AND COOPERTION 
The U.S. has proven to be a formidable advocate of increased cooperation 
between the littoral states and ASEAN as a whole in the post 9/11 period compared to 
that in the years prior to 9/11.  While the security context in Southeast Asia remained a 
regional problem prior to 9/11, the attack against the U.S. began to reshape the security 
communities in Southeast Asia.115  “The Southeast Asia states have come to accept the 
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fact that terrorism and criminal activities do not respect national frontiers … yet 
cooperation has been limited as governments have preferred to act at a national level.”116  
National level preferences of action these states from taking meaningful steps forward in 
addressing the maritime security issue and reflect the pre 9/11 thought processes of the 
states.  It appears that despite a group acceptance that terrorism and criminal activities are 
transnational, the ASEAN Way remains an important aspect of each states identity and is 
reflected in the multilateral security cooperation frameworks that these states have 
engaged in.  Operation MALSINDO, the most interesting framework, still shows signs 
that non-interference and sovereignty remain important but these norms appear to be 
subsiding enabling these states to become more flexible. 
Mistrust and animosities are still present among the littoral states but these 
feelings are also diminishing enough to where greater levels of cooperation are not out of 
the question.  As Malaysia and Singapore have matured politically they have begun to see 
that their fates are in a way intertwined and that it would be mutually beneficial for each 
to be more cooperative and accommodating towards one another.117  It would not be a 
stretch to think that such is the case for all the states in Southeast Asia.  While there may 
no longer be a unifying externality such as communism in the post 9/11 period, their 
shared sense of regional identity through ASEAN and other regional associations and 
groups has come a long way in shaping where their loyalties lie.  While these loyalties 
may not be to the extent that we find between the U.S. and Japan or the U.S. and Great 
Britain we can see a strengthening of ties between the littoral states in their multilateral 
cooperation efforts. 
1. Individual and Bilateral Measures 
Despite the apparent lack of collective ASEAN interest in the events of 9/11 each 
individual littoral state has stepped up its efforts in tackling issues of criminal activity, 
both pirate activity and terrorism in general after 9/11.  Malaysia and Singapore 
especially, because of their higher levels of intelligence sharing capabilities, have been 
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able to help in the GWOT by imprisoning a number of suspected terrorists and criminals.  
Indonesia meanwhile, largely because of their less structured police and intelligence 
forces as well as their stance that terrorism is largely a U.S. problem has done little to 
contribute to the GWOT in the short-term after 9/11.118  All three states have begun to 
bolster their own forces in assets and organization especially in the maritime domain after 
9/11. 
Singapore, because of its small size and center for maritime trade, is the most 
susceptible to acts of maritime terrorism and piracy.  This is reflected in the number of 
individual measures that is has taken.  Oil tankers, upon their arrival to Singapore, are 
required to give a 24-hour notice though this is not surprising as many ports have 
different time notification requirements for ships entering and leaving port.  Singapore 
has also strengthened security sea checkpoints like the Singapore cruise center, escorts 
high value merchant vessels with its Navy in its own territorial waters, marks out routes 
and other commercial vessels of importance to keep them clear of sensitive areas such as 
anchorages and installations and Singapore also deploys equipment capable of detecting 
radiation at border entry points to screen containers and personnel.119 
At Singapore’s operations level it has adopted a coordinated approach among 
different agencies within its bureaucracy much like the U.S. has done with the creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security.  Singapore has begun coordination efforts among 
its Maritime Port Authority, police, Coast Guard and Navy with each covering separate 
areas of maritime defense so each organization does not overlap efforts.120  Furthermore, 
the Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT) were created after 2001 and board 
selected vessels that are transiting into or out of Singaporean ports.121 
Singapore has also begun to work more closely with maritime organizations such 
as the IMO by implementing the International Ships and Port Facility Code, an 
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amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.122  The ships  
and port facility code is a “comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of 
ships and port facilities” and was implemented in response to the perceived threats to 
ships and port facilities after 9/11.123 
Malaysia and Indonesia have increased their own efforts but in the case of 
Indonesia itself it lacks the assets and overall capability to significantly increase the 
effectiveness of their measures.  By all accounts Indonesia is the world’s largest 
archipelagic state.  It comprises over 17,500 islands and over 50,000 miles of 
coastline.124  These figures present a formidable challenge in effectively patrolling this 
area single-handedly.   
Another issue with Indonesia lies in the fact that the Indonesian provinces are 
responsible and have authority over Indonesia’s territorial waters that extend 12NM from 
the respective provinces coastline.125  This presents a problem of decentralization. 
Despite all these issues Indonesia does have a plan to modernize and strengthen its 
maritime assets.  According to the Chief of the Indonesian Navy in 2004 the Indonesian 
Navy is not only modernizing but it is also beginning to have a new emphasis on coastal 
interdiction and the increasing of patrols within its own territory.126  Furthermore, 
Indonesia has created Navy Control Command Centers in Batam and Belawan with 
special equipment and forces that are said to be able to respond to incidents at sea.127  
Believing that some pirates and terrorists likely come from impoverished areas of the 
country, the Indonesia government has begun dissuasion programs that focus on 
alleviating poverty and increasing the general welfare of people in priority areas around 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.128 Regular operations have also begun to be 
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undertaken by Indonesia’s Western Fleet in what is known as Operation Gurita, a move 
that the IMB Piracy Reporting chief Noel Chong believes has led to a drop in the number 
of attacks in Indonesian waters.129  This operation consists of the Indonesian Navy 
deploying maritime assets over the Strait of Malacca and other known hot spots of pirate 
activity.130 
Malaysia, like Singapore has taken a number of individual measures in their fight 
against maritime terrorism and piracy.  A number of radar tracking stations have been 
built along the strait and police officers have been placed onboard various small craft like 
tugboats and barges that traverse the straits.131  Malaysia has also created the Malaysia 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) whose responsibilities are for search and 
rescue, the management of maritime crime, and the collection of intelligence to ensure 
Malaysian maritime security.132  The agency will bring together several maritime 
agencies including the Royal Malaysian Police, the Fisheries Department, Immigrations 
Department and the Customs and Marine Departments of the Malaysian government.133  
Malaysian Martine Police Chief, Muhamad Muda, went on record in 2002 to declare that 
Malaysia was on the guard against possible maritime terrorist attacks via speed boats and 
are monitoring incoming and outgoing traffic of all vessels entering and berthing in 
Malaysian ports.134 
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2. Multilateral Measures 
a. ASEAN 
Since the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11, ASEAN has taken 
on a decidedly different stance with respect to taking collective action against piracy and 
maritime terrorism.  The post 9/11 period marks its attempt to change its approach of 
terrorism from a domestic to more of a regional orientation.135 As always there were 
disagreements among the states on how to combat transnational crime.  These cleavages 
included disagreement over the extent to which they should fight terrorism collectively 
and how deeply states like the U.S. should be involved with the cooperation. What the 
members of ASEAN did do was hold a number of meetings and sign declarations that 
reflect their change in perception. 
In November of 2001, the member states of ASEAN signed a Declaration 
of Joint Action to Counter Terrorism.136  While this particular document did not tackle 
the issues that divided ASEAN on terrorism or lay out a plan for the member states to 
take explicit action on it does demonstrate that for ASEAN and its members, terrorism is 
a significant long term issue that should be looked at and dealt with on a regional level.  
In the document the ASEAN members said they believed acts of terrorism to be “a direct 
challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN” and that they 
are committed to countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts.137  To 
this end ASEAN tasked their ministers to follow-up on the elements of the document and 
encouraged them to deepen, enhance and strengthen the cooperation ties between 
them.138 
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At the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) that 
was held in May of 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, the attending officials determined it would be 
best for them to deal exclusively with the issue of piracy.139  At the SOMTC a 
comprehensive Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (POACTC) was approved 
but unlike other plans approved by ASEAN what makes this different from other plans is 
that this action plan has deadlines for each work program contained within it.140   The 
general objective of the POACTC is to “encourage ASEAN member countries to expand 
their efforts in combating transnational crime at the national and bilateral levels to the 
regional level.”141   
The plan has a number of specific objectives as well.  These objectives 
range from improving ASEAN Chiefs of National Police dialogue for information 
exchange, institutional capacity building and expanding extra-regional cooperation.142  
The POACTC totally diversifies and expands the issues that ASEAN is willing to deal 
with and we see that maritime terrorism and piracy are beginning to be viewed as 
separate but similar issues that need to be dealt with by ASEAN’s members.  The act of 
instituting the POACTC also demonstrates that ASEAN now understands that new forms 
of organized crime transcend national borders and political sovereignty, two of the most 
important and closely guarded components of the ASEAN way.  
b. ReCAAP 
Japan, like the U.S., has a vested interest in a free SLOC in the Strait of 
Malacca for many, if not all, of the reasons the U.S. does.  In 2001 Japan proposed the 
idea of a regional maritime coalition to include Japanese Maritime Self-Defense 
Forces.143   This proposal, like other initiatives and proposals brought up after 9/11 for 
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extra-regional military support, failed because of the norms of the ASEAN way.  Other 
forms of aid such as money and training have been welcome additions for the littoral 
states unlike foreign military presence. 
A Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was proposed in 2001 by Japan in the 
ASEAN+3 forum and was finalized in 2004.  Together with an Information Sharing 
Center (ISC) based in Singapore the purpose of the ReCAAP ISC is to exchange 
information among its members on incidents of piracy and armed robbery, to facilitate 
operational cooperation among its members, analyze the patterns and trends of piracy and 
armed robbery and to support the capacity building efforts of its members.144  The ISCs 
first head of operations is a Japanese national.145 
ReCAAP is almost a microcosm of how the cooperation efforts of the 
littoral states have increased over time.  ReCAAP builds on information exchange which 
the littoral states find comfortable but what is interesting is how they have allowed an 
extra-regional actor to play a large role in the cooperation scheme.  In Chapter II there 
was a brief account of the Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation of Southeast 
Asia.  For a long period of time afterwards Southeast Asians resented the Japanese.  
ReCAAP was initially a Japanese plan and it has been adopted by the littoral states.  
ReCAAP shows that tensions have begun to ease and cooperating with extra-regional 
actors is becoming not only more common, but deeper as well. 
c. RMSI 
Perhaps the extra-regional proposed cooperation effort that has made the 
largest splash among the littoral states would have to be the Regional Maritime Security 
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Initiative (RMSI).  The RMSI was initially proposed in 2004 during testimony given to 
the U.S. House of Representatives by Admiral Thomas Fargo, who was then the 
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command.146  In its original form RMSI intended to have 
U.S. Marines and other military units patrol the Strait of Malacca to act as a deterrence 
and counter the threat of piracy and maritime terrorism.147  A follow on proposal 
consisted of three components.  A situation picture of the traffic in the Strait of Malacca, 
a decision making structure to decide on the actions to be taken in case of emergency or 
clandestine action and a standby maritime force to act on the decision that was made.148   
The basic idea was that U.S. forces would share information with the 
littoral states and patrol the Strait of Malacca on high-speed vessels that would 
conceivably deter acts of terrorism in the strait as well as be able to prosecute them when 
situations would present themselves.149  While Singapore was a supporter of the RMSI, 
both Indonesia and Malaysia rejected it.  The rejection stemmed from the basis of 
sovereignty over their territorial waters and their unwillingness to accept help by extra-
regional powers that were out of the information sharing, training and financial assistance 
scope.   
In 2005 when Admiral Mike Mullen became the Chief of Naval 
Operations for the U.S. Navy, he had a vision of a “thousand ship Navy.”  This thousand 
ship Navy would be composed of not only U.S. ships but also ships from nations around 
the world who were interested in protecting the safety of the world’s oceans and SLOCs.  
Like many of the military cooperation efforts in the post 9/11 period it is like a coalition 
of the willing.  In response to this idea a veteran of the Indonesian Coast Guard said that, 
“we may need a thousand ships, but not the Americans. These are our straits.”150  The 
government of Indonesia feels like if the U.S., or any foreign state, were allowed to patrol 
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in its waters that would constitute an inconsistency with international law and would be 
harmful to its own national interests.151  Malaysia, like Indonesia feels the same way, and 
given these perceptions of the potential threat posed to their national integrity Malaysia 
and Indonesia agreed in June 2004 to enhance and increase their naval patrols in the 
Strait of Malacca.152 
The RMSI proposal in its original form did not make it past the discussion 
phase but it was an important catalyst for near-term cooperation arrangements between 
the littoral states.  The U.S. may have already been pegged to act unilaterally in many 
cases when it sees that there is no other alternative.  To prevent this from happening the 
littoral states stepped up and began engaging in multilateral security cooperation.  
d. FPDA 
The Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) is a number of 
arrangements between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and 
Singapore.  The FPDA began as an arrangement providing Malaysia and Singapore 
security as they transitioned and developed their own national defense capabilities.153  
Over time, the FPDA has evolved a robust infrastructure for consultations among the 
member states and it has developed a significant exercise and training program.154  
The first time that the members participated in a joint exercise in which all 
components, air, land and sea, were combined was in 1997 in an exercise called Flying 
Fish.155  Since then, the scope of the exercises have been expanded.  In a 2003 meeting 
of the members of the FPDA it was agreed that the FPDA would begin to incorporate 
non-conventional threat scenarios such as maritime security exercises and that the 
members of would gradually allow the inclusion of non-military agencies to join in on the 
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exercises.156 This expansion was realized in 2004 in the exercise Bersama Lima which 
included an anti-terror sea drill and maritime interdiction operations.157 
Just after the U.S. proposed RMSI in March 2004 members of the FPDA 
held a meeting and shortly after issued a statement saying that its members recognized 
the need to adapt to issues of transnational crime including terrorism and other non-
conventional sources.158  Here we can see that extra-regional actors have influenced what 
the littoral states do.  The FPDA statement was released in June 2004 and Operation 
MALSINDO began in July 2004.  This is no coincidence.  Fearing that their sovereignty 
and credibility would be in danger the littoral states were influenced to act in a way that 
they have never done before. 
e. MSSP  
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have only recently arrived at a quasi 
security cooperation arrangement in 2004 with the initiation of Operation MALSINDO 
(Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore).  This operation was the first time that the littoral states 
committed to conducting coordinated patrols with one another in a multilateral, rather 
than bilateral, setting.159   Also known as the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP) or 
Malacca Straits Security Initiative (MSSI) this operation consists of the states allocating a 
number of vessels for coordinated patrols in the Malacca Strait and is aimed at reducing 
piracy and smuggling activities that occur in it.160 When the operation came into effect in 
2004 there were 17 ships assigned to it.161  Indonesia contributed 7 ships and both 
Malaysia and Singapore contributed 5 ships.162  In respecting the sovereignty of each 
state the ships only patrol the territorial waters of the state they are from.163  
                                                 
156 Bristow, 8. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 2. 
159 Teo, 546. 





In 2005, to augment Operation MALSINDO, the littoral states agreed to 
the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) Initiative.164  Those participating in the EiS initiative 
contribute two patrols a week with Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and these craft are 
allowed to fly no closer then 3NM from land of the EiS states.165  A military officer from 
each state is onboard during missions and is charged with alerting their respective 
monitoring agencies with any suspicious contacts.166 The MPAs conduct two patrols a 
week along designated areas along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.167 
In the evolution of the MSSP, a number of important changes have been 
implemented.  Hot pursuit in the earlier iteration of the program was strictly not allowed 
but as time has passed it has been incorporated into the initiative.  The catch for hot 
pursuit is that the states rely on bilateral agreements between them on whether or not they 
are allowed to pursue a vessel into another state’s territorial waters.168  The littoral states 
have also created a hotline in the case that a warship of one state does have to pursue a 
vessel into the territorial waters of another participating state.169 
In late April of 2006, a historic meeting on expanding the MSSP took 
place between the littoral states in Batam, Indonesia.  At the meeting they finalized and 
singed a Standard Operating Procedure for the MSSP.170  What’s more, an agreement to 
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oversee the MSSP.171  Parts of its mission include being a common organization that is 
central to the communication, intelligence exchange and coordination for operational 
measures dealing with the patrols.172 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the post 9/11 period, the levels of security cooperation among the littoral states 
has been increasing steadily. The events of 9/11 have led to a “reorientation in the way 
Southeast Asian states interact with each other.”173  This growth and evolution in 
cooperation can be attributed to three things.  The first is an easing of tensions, the 
second is the formation of a common threat perception of piracy and maritime terrorism 
and the third is pressure from extra-regional actors. 
Extra-regional pressure in the post 9/11 period was greater then it was in the pre 
9/11 period.  Japan has consistently been an advocate of increasing the capabilities of the 
littoral states since the 1980s and 90s and it was only until after 2001 did Japan’s 
proposals begin making any forward progress.  The ReCAAP and associated ISC are far 
better then any type of maritime information sharing networks that were present in the 
straits prior to 9/11. 
The U.S. has not historically held Southeast Asia in high regard but after 9/11 this 
outlook changed.  Southeast Asia was said to be the second front on the GWOT. States 
like the U.S. and Japan do think that threat of maritime terrorism is real despite there 
being no hard evidence that a nexus between maritime terrorism and piracy exists.  
Because piracy attacks in the straits have remained at relatively high levels compared to 
the rest of the world, the U.S. has taken a vested interest in maintaining the safety and 
stability of the region, especially its SLOCs.  The RMSI proposed by the U.S. reflects 
this concern and was one of the major catalysts for maritime security cooperation among 
the littoral states.  
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The perception of piracy and maritime terrorism is also a catalyst for maritime 
security cooperation.  The events of 9/11 had its effects on the world community, 
specifically with the U.S. and its closest allies.  Agencies within the U.S. were brought 
under an umbrella organization in the Department of Homeland Security, airport and port 
security was increased and the U.S., as a part of its overall strategy to prevent future 
terrorist attacks, forwarded a number of different initiatives.  In the maritime realm these 
initiatives include the Container Security Initiative and the Proliferation Security 
Initiative.  The Container Security Initiative aims at protecting ports from possible 
weapons hidden in shipboard containers and the Proliferation Security initiative is an 
initiative whose aim is to interdict vessels suspected of carrying weapons of mass 
destruction and the materials required for creating them. 
The terrorist bombings of the M/V Kalifonia and M/V Limburg as well as the 
triple Bali bombings in the post 9/11 period also marked a significant shift in the 
perceptions of the littoral states, especially for Indonesia and Malaysia.  These events 
marked a divergence from previous positions they had held prior to their occurrences.  
Malaysia was also shocked by the kidnapping of tourists and Malaysian citizens from the 
resort island of Sipidan by the ASG.174  This event was a threat to Malaysia’s own 
sovereignty, something it holds in high regard. After continued pressure from extra-
regional actors the littoral states finally agreed to begin maritime security cooperation in 
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IV. MARITIME ASSETS AND COORDINATION 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter briefly gives an overview of and examines the maritime assets of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to include sea and air assets.  While the tendency for 
increased cooperation between the littoral states is important, an analysis of the each 
state’s maritime assets and the coordination aspects of the MSSP in the current literature 
on them is lacking.  The goal of this chapter is to examine the different maritime assets of 
each state, the maritime asset procurement plans of each state and how they can be 
contributed to securing the Strait of Malacca.  This chapter will also discuss a few 
coordination aspects of the MSSP.  In analyzing the assets and aspects of coordination, 
recommendations resulting from this analysis may help in bolstering the cooperation 
efforts between the littoral states. 
B. INDONESIA  
The Indonesian military’s naval arm is called Tentara Nasional Indonesia – 
Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL). Indonesian military doctrine in the maritime sphere stresses the 
vital importance of maintaining the integrity and unity of its islands and maritime 
territory.175  Considering the vast area that is required to be patrolled by its maritime 
force, it would seem safe to assume that Indonesia has a substantial number of maritime 
assets and places a great deal of importance on its maritime security.  This general 
assumption is not the case.  The TNI-AL does not have sufficient vessels or assets to 
patrol its more than 17,000 islands and 54,000 km of coastline.176  At the present time 
Indonesia maintains approximately 80 patrol craft, but these craft are outdated and 
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insufficient for security patrols along the archipelago.177  In 2004, former naval Chief of 
Staff Admiral Sondakh informed the Indonesian parliament that the majority of ships in 
the TNI-AL were non-operational because of deficiencies in funding, maintenance, and 
spare parts.178  It is believed that only 25 ships in the Navy are operational at any given 
time, and more pessimistic analysts believe there are only 20 functioning patrol craft and 
one or two functioning aircraft to combat terrorism, piracy, and other illegal or illicit 
activities.179  
Admiral Sondakh said that in order to secure Indonesia’s vast maritime expanse it 
would require 762 ships.180  762 ships, even if they are all patrol craft, is a large number 
that would cost a great deal of money to procure, maintain and man.  Another Indonesian 
official told the Antara news agency in 2004 that the Navy would require at least 300 
warships and 170 aircraft to properly manage its waters.181  Knowing that these large 
numbers of assets are out of the question Indonesia has begun a modernization and 
procurement program for its Navy so that it may become a more operationally and cost-
effective force.  Indonesia’s naval air capabilities, like its surface fleet, are questionable 
though efforts have been made to update its aircraft with more modern versions.  Despite 
this, covering upwards of 54,000 km of coastline is difficult, if not impossible, and 
requires smart decision making on the part of Indonesia’s Navy. 
1. Maritime Assets 
a. Surface Fleet 
Indonesia’s surface fleet consists largely of frigates, corvettes, patrol craft 
and amphibious landing ships.  Of the four types of surface ships patrol craft are the most 
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numerous.  Classes of patrol craft include the Kal Kangean, Todak (PB57 MkV), Singa 
(PB57 Mk 1 and II), PC-36, Sibarau and Kakap (PB57 Mk III and IV) classes.182  Of 
these the Kal Kangean class makes up the bulk of the patrol craft fleet with 65 in service, 
but with a maximum speed of 18 such vessels are too slow to catch pirates should pursuit 
be required.183 
The Todak, Singa, and Kakap classes are the most useful.  Each vessel can 
attain a speed of 27 knots and in the case of the Kakap class 28 knots.184  These patrol 
craft have capable weapon systems with various types of crew-served weapons that can 
neutralize any small vessel should it be required and they have sufficiently long legs, 
approximately 6,100 NM at a cruising speed of 21 knots.185   
b. Naval Aviation 
Indonesia’s naval aviation fleet consists of three main types of MPAs.  
They are the N22B Nomad Missionmaster, Searchmaster B and Searchmaster L 
respectively.  The Indonesian Navy has 15 Missionmasters, 10 Searchmaster B and 6 
Searchmaster L currently in service.186  All of these aircraft are designed and built by 
Australia’s Government Aircraft Factory known as the Aerospace Technologies 
Aerospace.   
These aircraft platforms come from the same family of Nomads and 
therefore all have the same general functionality.  The N22B Nomad Missionmaster is a 
twin turbo-prop short take-off and landing aircraft.187  It has a maximum range of 
                                                 
182 “Navy, Indonesia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment (7 February 2008) http://www8.janes.com 
(accessed 24 March 2008). 
183 Ibid and “Kal Kangean Class (Coastal Patrol Craft) (WPB,.” Jane’s Naval Auxiliary Service (12 
February 2008) http://www8.janes.com (accessed 26 March 2008). 
184 NOTE: Speeds taken from Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. 
185 NOTE: Ranges taken from Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. 
186 “Navy, Indonesia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment (7 February 2008) http://www8.janes.com 
(accessed 24 March 2008). 
187 “ASTA (GAF) Nomad,” Jane’s Research Tools (23 July 2007) http://www8.janes.com  (accessed 
25 March 2008) 
 54
580NM at sealevel and 730NM at altitudes of 10,000 ft.188  The Searchmaster versions of 
the Nomad aircraft are short fuselage military versions whose mission is forward area 
support, maritime surveillance, personnel and equipment transport.189 
c. Command and Control 
One of the major problems with the naval arm of the Indonesian maritime 
arm is the number of agencies responsible for the security and law enforcement of the 
sea.  At present there are ten different agencies that in some way responsible for maritime 
security with much of the responsibility lying with the TNI and police force.190  To help 
in the coordinating aspects of maritime security the Indonesian government has begun to 
establish the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board or Barkorkamla.191  The 
mission of the Barkorkamla is five fold and include the formulating and determining of 
general policy in the field of security, the coordination of activities and maritime security 
operations in Indonesian waters, the formulating and determining of technical and 
administrative support, the assisting of the enhancement of the institutional capabilities in 
maritime security and finally to motivate the improvement of community participation in 
the field of maritime security.192 
d. Procurement 
There have been a number of calls for reform of Indonesia’s maritime 
force structure from within the state.  There have been proposed reforms to modernize the 
Navy, to focus on coastal interdiction, to build up rapid reaction forces and set up a 
reliable early warning system for attacks.193  Over 2 billion U.S. dollars are being spent 
on the procurement program and analysts suggest that the upgrade will consist mostly of 
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submarines and frigates that have been decommissioned from European navies.194  Over 
the next decade Indonesia plans to purchase up to 60 modern patrol vessels.195    
C. MALAYSIA 
 Like Indonesia, Malaysia’s peninsular geography provides it with special 
circumstances that other states do not have to necessarily deal with.  Its two coasts, 
totalling 4,675 km in length provide it with a diversity of maritime threats and 
priorities.196 Unlike Indonesia, there is no question that maritime coordination activities 
stem through the Navy and the MMEA.  These two organizations are overall responsible 
for maritime security in Malaysia.  The Navy’s official primary peacetime roles are, 
among others, to protect offshore resources and assist civil agencies in anti-piracy and 
EEZ protection.197  The role of the MMEA was discussed in Chapter III.  In addition to 
establishing the MMEA as a coordinating agency Malaysia has also set up new naval 
stations in areas of heightened security concerns.198 
1. Maritime Assets 
a. Surface Fleet 
The Malaysian surface fleet primarily consists of frigates, corvettes and 
fast attack craft.  The combined number of these combatants in the surface fleet is 31 of 
which 14 are fast attack craft.  All the patrol craft are generally similar and have speeds 
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of approximately 25 knots.199  The  Handalan, Perdana and Jerong fast attack craft have 
the same types of capabilities and with ranges in excess of 1500NM at cruising speeds of 
15 kts and are capable of patrolling Malaysia’s coastal waters and intercepting ships 
engaged in illicit activity.200  The frigates and corvettes in the Malaysian fleet are all 
capable surface assets and have helicopter platforms to extend the search range of these 
ships.   
b. Naval Aviation 
Malaysia’s maritime air patrol assets are composed of one type, the King 
Air 200TB. The 200TB is a twin-turboprop aircraft with ranges of approximately 
1500NM depending on the given cruising altitude.201  It is a multi-sensor surveillance 
aircraft that is capable of using forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR), optical sensors 
and cameras.202 
c. Procurement 
The Malaysian military has a wide range of military platforms all procured 
from different countries and this is a cause internal operability problems.203  Not only are 
logistics and other support mechanisms constrained due to operating platforms acquired 
from multiple countries but operational problems in the Malaysian military are evident as 
a result of this problem.204  As a result an emphasis has been placed on joint service 
operations. 
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Malaysia plans on modernizing and procuring new platforms for its 
surface fleet.  Current plans call for six offshore patrol vessels centered around the New 
Generation Patrol Vessel and the acquisition of two Batch 2 Jebat class frigates as well as 
the upgrading of two of its Katsuri class corvettes.205  Malaysia has also begun to 
upgrade its small MPA fleet and has concluded an agreement that covers all four of its 
King Airs.  This upgrade involves the installation of an Airborne Maritime Situation 
Control System that consists of a new tactical command system, ocean master 
surveillance radar and updated FLIR system.206  Perhaps the most impressive part of this 
upgrade is the ocean master surveillance system that will give these aircraft increased 
capabilities for detection, tactical processing, situation display, navigation and weather 
avoidance.207  The system has a range of 200NM and can track up to 32 targets 
automatically.208 
D. SINGAPORE 
Of the three littoral states Singapore is best known for its economic success as one 
of the East Asian Tigers.  Since acquiring statehood it has made tremendous economic 
progress and has become one of the world’s most formidable and technologically 
advanced economies.  As a result of this success the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) 
has a modern and well-maintained force of submarines, frigates, corvettes and fast attack 
craft.  Singapore, because of its small size (only 193 km of coastline) and relatively large 
GDP, has the ability to field and train a modern and complete naval force.209 Malaysia 
and Indonesia do not possess the same operational, technological or financial capacity as 
the Singaporeans to combat piracy in areas historically prone to pirate attacks and 
political unrest.210 
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1. Maritime Assets 
a. Surface Fleet 
The Surface Fleet of the RSN incorporates assets that reflect the security 
threats that Singapore believes that it faces or could face in the future.  The RSNs 
primary role is to protect Singapore’s SLOCs as the Singaporean economy is highly 
dependent on trade in and out of its port.211  It consists of modern frigates, patrol vessels 
and minehunters as well as amphibious landing craft.  The main force consists of a total 
of 33 frigates, corvettes and fast attack craft with the fast attack and patrol craft making 
up the largest numbers with 23.212  Singapore also has 14 FB31-42 class patrol craft in 
service.213 
The most modern of these vessels are the Formidable class frigates and 
Fearless class patrol craft.  The Formidable class frigate design is modeled after the 
French La Fayette class frigate and has a low radar, acoustic, infrared and 
electromagnetic signature making it a stealthy design.214  It uses the Terma Scanter 2001 
surface search and navigation radar and also boasts a Herakles multi-function radar that is 
the frigate’s primary surveillance radar.215  The Herakles radar can track in excess of 500 
air and surface contacts simultaneously and has a range up to 80 km.216  As a surface 
navigational radar the Terma Scanter can be used as surveillance radar, albeit at short 
ranges, but is normally used for the navigation of the vessel. 
The Fearlass class patrol craft are the most modern of the fast attack/patrol 
type vessels in the RSNs inventory.  The first six patrol craft that were delivered 
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specialized in Anti-Submarine Warfare.217  Subsequent versions are to be fitted with 
surface-to-surface missile systems.  The main sensor suite is Elta’s EL/M-2228X radar.  
Its maximum surface range is dependent on the radar’s horizon and it can track up to 400 
surface targets simultaneously.218  It is specially designed to detect small and medium 
sized targets making it especially useful for detecting types of ships pirates would most 
likely conduct operations from. 
b. Naval Aviation 
In the late 1990s, Singapore procured five modified Fokker-50 aircraft.  
These aircraft serve as MPAs for Singapore’s Navy.  They have effectively phased out 
the previous generation Singapore MPA in the Skyvan.  The Fokker-50 is capable of 
cruising speeds in excess of 150 knots and is equipped with a surface surveillance radar 
and an infra-red detection system that allows it to detect contacts in low visibility 
conditions.219 
c. Procurement 
Singapore maintains a defense-spending cap of 6 percent of GDP per the 
Singaporean government.  Singapore continues to modernize and procure additional 
Formidable class frigates and Fearless class patrol craft.  Both vessels are well ahead of 
their regional counterparts in terms of capabilities.  There are no reported plans of 
procuring additional MPAs but additional helicopters are being procured to be used with 
their helicopter capable surface platforms. 
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The continuing issue of coordinated versus joint patrols in the MSSP prevent the 
littoral states’ current assets from being deployed in a more efficient fashion.  
Coordinated operations require each force to use a chain of command that is country 
specific.  For example, if assets from each of these states were on a patrol and an 
Indonesian vessel were to site a ship involved in pirate activity it would take action but 
report the incident up its own chain of command.  This information would then be 
disseminated to the other units through their own chains of command making this type of 
arrangement inefficient and time consuming.  Figure 2 gives an example of the reporting 
procedures in this coordinated architecture. In the figure we can clearly see that the 
standard procedure is to first report incidents to a shore reporting station.  This shore 
station takes that information, analyzes it, and then reports it to surrounding units for 
action if the information is deemed relevant and important enough to act on. 
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Figure 2.   Illustration of Coordinated Reporting Procedures220 
 
This method of coordination is reflected in the command and control structures 
illustrated in Figure 3.  In this figure we can see that operations are coordinated through 
the individual states’ command and control structures.  This type of organization is 
inefficient.  In this type of organization information may be lost and unable to find its 
way to appropriate assets.  This type of organization may also help reinforce norms of 
sovereignty.  Assets may think it is only appropriate for information to be held by 
members of their own chain of command leaving out the other states.  If the assets were 
under the umbrella of one, unified command and control structure the assets could be 
quickly diverted to trouble spots as they are reported. 
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Figure 3.   MSSP Organizational Chart221 
 
These efforts can be made more efficient by bypassing the shore reporting station 
in the initial step of the procedure.  Units could use available communications equipment 
including bridge-to-bridge radios or other systems with greater ranges to notify 
participating units of the incident in order to expedite assistance.  In this instance a type 
of chat system would be useful.  Chat is basically an open discussion board that is in real 
time and used to make reports or pass on information to various units.  All members 
signed into the chat room can see what the information being passed along.  The U.S. 
Navy uses chat and it has been a tremendous help in coordinating events, forwarding 
reports and receiving commands.  This type of architecture may alleviate some of the 
problems with hot pursuit in that units will be able to react more quickly to vessels in 
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distress and pursue the suspected hostile vessels.  As it stands now, in accordance with 
the new SOP signed by the littoral states, hot pursuit is allowed up to 5NM of another 
country’s territory.222  Chat however requires technology that may not be readily 
available to the littoral states as this type of communication is passed through a satellite 
system. 
A high frequency (HF) communication system may also be useful in the instance 
that more advanced technologies are unavailable.  HF systems, because of their wave 
propagation properties, have very long ranges.  The U.S. uses this type of technology in 
its submarines and some air platforms including helicopters for long-range 
communications when other types of communication are unavailable.  This type of 
modification would be simple and the use of the system is relatively easy to maintain and 
operate. 
F. SMALL SHIPS AND SECURITY COOPERATION 
 A recent study by the RAND Corporation examines the feasibility of using small 
ships in theater security cooperation (TSC) for the United States.  TSC shares similar 
operational requirements of the MSSP in that the TSC goal is for U.S. military assets to 
work in concert with the military assets of other states.  The study looks at a number of 
different small sea platforms to determine which platform, if any, would be optimal in 
supporting the TSC strategy.  The research is based on finding the optimally capable 
vessel based off of their ability to operate freely in shallow water, operate from minor 
ports, operate in difficult sea states, operate for long periods and their ability to develop a 
surface picture, conduct boarding operations and engage hostile contacts.223  
 The three small ship categories in the study are the nearshore, coastal and offshore 
patrol vessels and are categorized based on tonnage, logistical requirements and 
command, control, communications and intelligence (C4I) capabilities.224  The nearshore 
                                                 
222 Ian J. Storey, e-mail message to author, 3 February 2008. 
223 Robert W. Button, Irv Blickstein, et al., Small Ships in Theater Security Cooperation (Santa 
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patrol vessel is dismissed based on these considerations but the study does not make a 
definitive recommendation on which type of vessel to be used.  The coastal and offshore 
patrol vessels are more promising in that they offer better survivability, greater endurance 
and improved habitability.225  The offshore patrol vessel is the most versatile in that it is 
able to undertake longer patrols and would have the greatest amount of independence.  
The study does recommend that when procuring any of these platforms it would be wise 
to procure a great number of them because there is value in quantity; these vessels would 
be able to support one another and provide the necessary C4I structure for operations.226  
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Figure 4.   MSSP Operating Area227 
                                                 
225 Button. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Figure taken from Assistant Chief of Staff Indonesian Navy for Panning and Budgeting at the 
MILOPS Conference Thailand 2006, “The Role of Indonesia to Secure the Malacca Strait,” Powerpoint 
Presentation, Bangkok, Thailand. 17-19 July 2006. 
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All three littoral states, in their military missions and roles, have pointed to piracy 
as a problem and have allocated maritime assets to address that need in the MSSP.  
Despite the importance placed on this type of activity, Malaysia and Indonesia have a 
limited capability relative to the areas they need to patrol.  Figure 4 shows the extent of 
the MSSP operating area.  Based on these latitudes the littoral states will have to patrol in 
excess of 90NM on both the Indonesian and Malaysian coasts as well as the area of water 
between the two landmasses.  This type of operation is very challenging.  If there were 
only a limited number of vessels dedicated to the MSSP, then information would be the 
most important component of the operation.  Intelligence would have to be collected and 
disseminated in order to properly position ships in areas where pirates are going to 
conduct operations or most likely to conduct operations. 
 The MPA assets of each state are significantly lacking.  The U.S. uses several 
platforms when conducting similar counter-narcotic missions in the Caribbean and the 
Eastern Pacific.  These assets include P-3s and KC-130s.  These aircraft have relatively 
long legs in that they can patrol a large area.  Depending on the speed at which these 
aircraft operate, their on-station times are generally 2-4 hours.  This is the type of asset 
that the littoral states need to incorporate into their own forces.  This would require not 
only procurement of the platforms but training as well.  The U.S. and Japan have these 
types of platforms and could train the operators for these platforms.  This type of aid 
would not be intrusive on the sovereignty of these states and may help in fostering better 
relations for the future. 
 Based on the study conducted by the RAND Corporation the types of patrol craft 
that are most prevalent in the inventories of the littoral states are considered nearshore 
patrol craft, the type of craft that are generally not effective for a MSSP type operation.  
These nearshore patrol craft would be most useful in defending ports and in traveling 
small distances away from their base of operations.  The frigates and corvettes each state 
possesses, as well as Singapore’s Formidable class patrol craft, can be considered 
offshore patrol vessels.  These vessels do not need to be close to their base of operations 
and can patrol areas for longer periods of time because they do not require the logistics  
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required in supporting nearshore patrol craft.  If the littoral states are not using these 
offshore vessels presently in the MSSP they should start.  It would be beneficial to have 







A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Piracy will continue to be a contentious issue in the international community as 
long as pirates continue to prey on vessels traveling on both the high seas and in SLOCs, 
such as the Strait of Malacca.  This is evident from the continuing problems we see in the 
Horn of Africa and the establishment of a U.S. Navy joint task force to curb the activity 
of the pirates.  Table 1 shows that the number of attacks, both actual and attempted, have 
steadily decreased since 2001 in the Strait of Malacca.  In 2007, the total number of 
attacks in Southeast Asia numbered 70, a decrease of 13 from the previous year.228  This 
data clearly shows that something changed from the period prior to 2001 and the period 
after it.  It could be that there has just been a decrease in pirate activity based on simple 
economics.  Maybe the pirates have found other ways to make money or piracy has 
become less lucrative.  Maybe many of the pirates have been captured and imprisoned.  I 
believe these scenarios are unlikely given the sustained pirate activity throughout the 
world.  Pirates continue to seize, harass and board vessels in the Strait of Malacca to this 
day though the actual numbers are lower than previous years.  What then has changed in 
Southeast Asia such that the numbers have decreased so dramatically from their recorded 
high in 2001?  As this thesis has shown, multilateral cooperation among the littoral states 
has increased significantly since then and is the main reason that the number of pirate 
attacks in the Strait of Malacca and its surrounding areas has declined. 
Multilateral security cooperation among the littoral states was not something that 
was routine in Southeast Asia.  In fact, this type of activity was taboo for Southeast Asian 
states for a greater part of their existence as independent states.  Despite their strong 
aversion to multilateral security cooperation, in 2004 the littoral states began Operation 
MALSINDO, which subsequently came to be called the MSSP and incorporated 
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maritime patrols on the sea and in the air.  The question that is most interesting then is 
why these states have begun this type of cooperation when in the past it was negligible or 
non-existent.  To answer this question, this thesis conducted a comparison between the 
cooperation efforts in the pre- and post-9/11 periods.  What we find is that an easing of 
tensions with each other and with extra-regional actors, changes in threat perception 
coupled with extra-regional pressure for these states to do more has led them to cooperate 
in a multilateral security framework.   
While the MSSP represents a step forward of security cooperation communities in 
Southeast Asia, we find that the maritime assets available, both sea and air, for these 
patrols are inadequate. In researching the types of maritime assets of each state, we can 
see that their lack of numbers, capabilities and interoperability present a challenge to 
patrolling each states’ own maritime areas.  This is especially true for the large states of 
Indonesia and Malaysia, which border on multiple bodies of water and encompass a 
number of small islands.  Current assets are also not conducive to developing more 
capable, joint cooperation capabilities among the littoral states because of their 
insufficient on-station times and because they are procured from different sources that 
does not allow for interoperability and sufficient communication.  If the littoral states 
were able to coordinate their efforts in buying off-the-shelf equipment for 
communications and command and control, this would go a long way toward making the 
MSSP more effective.  
B. EASING OF TENSIONS 
 Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have all had their shares of problems with one 
another in some way ever since each gained independence following the Second World 
War.  Indonesia and Malaysia have struggled to have good opinions of one another and 
the Indonesian “confrontation” of Malaysia did not help.  Singapore, having once been a 
part of Malaysia, has also had a series of nagging issues between it and Malaysia that 
continue until this day.  The water issue and Pedra Branca have been a cause of concern 
for both states and Singapore’s land reclamation project has upset not only Malaysia but 
Indonesia as well. 
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Though the water issue and Pedra Branca have continued to linger, what is 
important is that these issues are being handled in a responsible manner in that there have 
not been violent acts committed by any party against another.  These issues have been 
handled well considering the historical animosities and mistrust that these states share. 
The reason for the relatively peaceful nature of conflict resolution in these cases can be 
contributed to ongoing participation in regional organizations, specifically that of 
ASEAN. An institution like ASEAN remains the cornerstone for Malaysian foreign 
policy and has been a trend that has remained consistent since its independence in 
1957.229  Indonesia and Singapore also see ASEAN as a cornerstone of their foreign 
policies.  Of the three states, Singapore is the most flexible when it comes to ASEAN 
norms of non-interference and regional solutions to regional problems.  This can be 
attributed to the fact that Singapore is a city-state whose small size does not allow it some 
of the advantages that Indonesia and Malaysia have with regard to foreign and national 
policies. 
These states are also among the five founding members of ASEAN and were all 
deeply involved in shaping the association’s norms.  We can already see that these norms 
are deeply embedded into the characteristics of these states in how they act and deal with 
each other.  In subscribing to the ASEAN way and in signing the TAC, these states have 
committed themselves to solving regional problems with peaceful, regional solutions.  
Over time, and as these states have become more comfortable with one another through 
consistent interaction, this type of commitment has lessened the tensions among them and 
have made a significant contribution to their ability to participate in multilateral forms of 
cooperation. 
C. PERCEPTIONS 
 As tensions have eased among the littoral states, their perceptions on what is 
important regarding some foreign policy issues have converged.  This can be seen in their 
newfound emphasis on combating terrorism and piracy.  Prior to 9/11 there was no real 
sense that these types of issues were something that needed to be tackled collectively.  
                                                 
229 Lanti, 165. 
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Rather, each state chose to tackle the issues of piracy and terrorism on more of an 
individual basis.  The events of 9/11 were the catalyst of the change but were not in itself 
the only reason for the change in the thinking and threat perceptions of the littoral states 
as a group.   
 Other events also changed the perceptions of the national security issues for these 
states and formed the basis of a convergence in national security threat perceptions.  The 
bombing of the M/V Limburg and the M/V Kalifornia brought threats of maritime 
terrorism to the fore for the littoral states.  Until the triple Bali bombings in 2003, 
Indonesia did not believe that terrorism in general was a threat that required cooperation 
with other states but after the bombings they changed their stance and began increasing 
their efforts. 
D. EXTRA-REGIONAL PRESSURE 
 Pressure from extra-regional actors to do more when it comes to curbing the 
problem of piracy and the threat of maritime terrorism has helped push the littoral 
towards their current levels of cooperation.  Japan advocated greater cooperation in this 
area prior to 9/11 with the OPK concept, various other programs and aid to these states 
for maritime security in Southeast Asia.  The United States began a strong push for 
maritime security in the Strait of Malacca after 9/11 and was harshly criticized by 
Indonesia and Malaysia for its RMSI concept.  India also took part in pressuring the 
littoral states to do more when it began anti-piracy and anti-terrorism escort and patrol 
duties in tandem with the U.S. Navy after 9/11.230 
 The efforts of the U.S. and Indian navies just after 9/11 in the Strait of Malacca 
was a great cause of concern for the littoral states as they directly threatened the norms of 
the ASEAN way.  Indonesia and Malaysia believed that the U.S. presence alone in the 
strait would attract terrorist attacks.231  Malaysia’s Defense and Deputy Prime Minister, 
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in reaction to these incursions by extra-regional actors said, “We (Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Singapore) must tighten cooperation as it is our own responsibility to convince the 
international community that the straits will not be exposed to possibilities (maritime 
terrorism).”232 
E. LOOKING FORWARD 
1. Littoral States 
The littoral states have made great strides in recent years cooperating on security 
related matters.  In terms of maritime security, specifically these cooperation efforts have 
been effective in decreasing the number of pirate attacks in and around the Strait of 
Malacca but more could be done.  As tensions ease even more, the framework they have 
established can be broadened and eventually transformed into a joint, rather than 
cooperative, framework.  This transformation would surely make their efforts more 
effective and could possibly eradicate piracy in the Strait of Malacca and significantly 
deter the possibility or prospects of maritime terrorism.  As the level of cooperation rises, 
these states must also look towards procuring maritime assets that can effectively conduct 
the mission of maritime patrols and interdiction as well as providing an interoperable 
capability among each other’s forces.   
The current course of the littoral states is very promising and provides a base for 
increasing their cooperation efforts.  Continued participation in ASEAN as well as other 
regional forums is important, because it provides a good way for them to establish 
enduring, peaceful relations.  Participation in each other’s officer education and training 
programs has become increasingly commonplace among ASEAN armed forces.233  This 
type of program provides each state with valuable experience and helps to create a sense  
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of trust among each other.  Furthermore, this type of intra-military education can provide 
each state a sense of how each other’s military works helping to expand the joint 
cooperation efforts of the MSSP. 
2. United States 
The U.S. Navy continues to have the most dominant and powerful Navy in the 
world.  For many years it has been the guarantor of freedom of the seas and has 
maintained open SLOCs for world commerce and travel.  The oceans are vast and certain 
areas require special attention because of various issues including piracy, narcotics and 
human smuggling.  As a result it would be in the best interest of the U.S. to have partners 
in its fight against these types of transnational activities.  The MSSP is a good example of 
the sort of multilateral cooperative effort that is in the U.S. interest to support.   
In studying the emergence and evolution of the MSSP, the U.S. can take away a 
number of lessons.  The first lesson is that cooperation efforts not involving the U.S. can 
make a tangible difference.  In the Strait of Malacca, we see a dramatic decrease in the 
number of actual and attempted pirate attacks.  The second lesson is that putting political 
pressure on states to do more can, over time, affect the efforts that they put forward on 
particular issues.  The third lesson is that perceptions on a certain subject can affect the 
amount of effort put towards it.  The fourth lesson is that many states, notably those in 
Southeast Asia, do not always see U.S. involvement as a good thing, especially when it 
comes down to issues of sovereignty.  Engaging these states through methods other than 
direct intervention, such as monetary aid and training, can go a long way toward creating 
an atmosphere conducive to greater cooperation.  Using these lessons learned will help 
the U.S. in solidifying and building on cooperation agreements between states as well as 
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